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Upon arrival in Beirut, most of the young Syrian
adults I encountered decided to settle and live in
areas of the Lebanese capital which represent
important poles of urban centrality
In my research, I examine some of the underexplored links 
between cities and displacement in the context of the Syrian 
crisis, focusing on the 2011-2016 time period. I do this by 
analysing how some young Syrian adults belonging main-
ly to the middle-class had progressively decided to relocate 
to cities in countries bordering Syria (Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey) since the start of the Syrian conflict. I begin by high-
lighting the importance of centrality for these migrants, i.e. 
of living in central areas of cities. I also underline the strate-
gies used to secure accommodation. I then present how some 
young Syrian adults were living between urban centralities, 
commuting back and forth on a regular basis between mul-
tiple cities and countries, including sometimes their home 
town. Finally, I show how this search for new centralities 
was often perceived as a temporary move, before being able 
to either settle back home, or move further.
To illustrate these uses of urban space, and their im-
pacts on cities, I will refer mainly to young Syrian adults 
who I encountered in Beirut between 2011 and 2016 while 
conducting field research . They were mostly moving alone, 
i.e. they were single and did not have any children. There 
was often a mix of motivations according to which they de-
cided to move, and these reasons were often entangled. They 
were ranging from having lost their occupations in Syria, 
or part of it, because of the crisis, to avoiding compulsory 
military service or because of political views, and more gen-
erally due to the lack of security and (economic) perspectives 
in their country. Their move was thus situated somewhere 
between forced and voluntary displacement. Some young 
Syrians also noted that a large number of their acquaintanc-
es had come to Beirut, or travelled even further. 
The Lebanese capital is only a few hours drive from the 
Syrian capital, Damascus. In 2016, Lebanon hosted about 1 
million Syrian refugees . Among 30,000 of them were in 
the Beirut Governorate , which does not include surround-
ing municipalities connected to the municipality of Beirut. 
Many more resided in these peripheral areas of the capital. 
Moreover, these numbers only included people registered 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Many others took the decision not to register. 
This was the case for a majority of young adults I meet. 
They were generally stressing that the reason why they did 
not register was because they did not feel ‘in need’. A report 
was mentioning an overall estimation of a number of 1.55 
million Syrians in this situation in Lebanon. It is referring 
to them as mostly ‘middle-class professionals and wealthy 
Syrians’ . Some of them were already in Lebanon prior to the 
start of the crisis in their country, but from then on unable 
to return. This is certainly a simplified categorisation as, for 
example, numerous less well-off seasonal migrant workers 
should also be included in that group. And they also had 
been moving back and forth between Syria and Lebanon for 
a long time. Most of the young adults I met, however, fitted 
in the ‘middle-class professionals’ category.
Searching for centrality
Upon arrival in Beirut, most of the young Syrian adults I 
encountered decided to settle and live in areas of the Leba-
nese capital which represent important poles of urban cen-
trality (mostly in the neighbourhoods referred to as Hamra 
and Achrafieh). These locations were important in terms of 
re-creating social networks, in part with other Syrians who 
had also moved to Beirut. It was also important in order to 
find work opportunities and to live in, or near, the vibrant 
areas of the city. For many, this search for urban central-
ity was however not completely new in their lives. Many 
of these young adults had in fact, already before 2011, been 
attracted by this centrality when in Syria, and above all in 
Damascus. For those who were not originally from Damas-
cus, many had been living for some time in the Syrian cap-
ital. They had moved there from their hometown, mainly 
to complete their higher education, or in order to find work 
opportunities.
This search for centrality required finding an accom-
modation. When in Syria, especially if they were not origi-
nally from Damascus, and if they did not have any relatives 
living there, young Syrian adults were often renting rooms 
in old damascene houses and more recent flats in several 
central areas of the Syrian capital (e.g. the Old City, Sarouja, 
Shaalan). Some of them would even rent whole houses or 
flats, and sublet rooms to other young people. These accom-
modations would also often be shared with young foreign-
ers who were coming for short periods to Damascus, e.g. to 
learn Arabic.
When they decided to move to Lebanon starting 2011, 
to be able to live in central areas of Beirut, where accommo-
dation costs are high, many young Syrian adults belonging 
to the middle-class replicated the same system. They rented 
rooms in shared flats, or whole flats, either individually or 
collectively, and then sublet rooms, mainly to other young 
Syrians and foreigners. By comparison, only about 60% of 
Syrian refugees who registered with UNHCR in Beirut and 
its periphery were able at that time to find shelter in apart-
People gathering in front of a theatre showing a Syrian
theatre play in Beirut, 2016. © Lucas Oesch
IN the context of the recent so-called refugee ‘crisis’, attention has been given 
to how train stations in large cities become important transit hubs for forced 
migrants, on makeshift camps of tents which appeared around such transit 
hubs, and on several urban infrastructures, such as old sport stadiums and 
airports which were used to ‘host’ or ‘exclude’ forced migrants. However, 
less attention has been directed to other types of expressions dynamics 
between forced migration in urban areas. Through his research, Oesch looks 
closer at how the last decade’s unrest in the Middle East and the resulting 
displacement have impacted the urban space in less visible ways. Or, put in 
other words, how cities play an important role in the lives of displaced for 
less visible reasons. 
Lucas Oesch is a researcher at 
the University of Luxembourg. He 
spent several years doing fieldwork 
and lived in Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. He holds a PhD from the 
Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies (IHEID) in 
Geneva, and was a research fellow 
at the Universities of Neuchâtel, 
Lyon and Manchester. This research 
was supported by a Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF) 
fellowship (161164).
by
Lucas Oesch
Forced migration 
and living between 
cities: Young 
Syrian adults 
in Beirut
1 0 4 1 0 5FLUID-PERMANENCE
ments, the remaining were living in informal settlements, 
substandard buildings and collective centers . The propor-
tion of registered refugees living in apartments in, and near, 
the Lebanese capital was however higher in comparison to 
the rest of the country. 
For the young Syrians who had never left their home 
town or even family house, moving to Beirut was a dras-
tic change in their lifestyle. However, for others who had 
already moved in the past within Syria, mainly from their 
home town to Damascus, this was rather an extension of 
their ‘mobility pattern’ and a replication of their previous 
lifestyle. Majid, a young Syrian actor, would even see a 
form of intergenerational continuity in this mobility. He 
explained that, in the past, “to find work, our parents had to 
move from their villages to cities in Syria, and now, because 
of the war, we have to change cities again” . Nevertheless, 
this time, it implied crossing an international border and 
going to another country. As a matter of fact, many of the 
young Syrians I encountered had never been to Beirut before, 
or only for very short visits. Rima, who had been in Beirut 
for about 9 months when I met her, would tell me in an 
amused way that “it is the first foreign country ever that I 
am visiting” .
Beirut had since long ago been an important place to 
come for work or stay for Syrians. This was however most-
ly the case for seasonal workers (e.g. construction workers) 
whose number in Lebanon was estimated around 350,000 
before the start of the crisis in 2011 . It also concerned the 
elites , but not as much less well-off young adults of the 
middle-class.
In-between cities
When they arrived in Beirut and settled in some of its cen-
tral areas, many young Syrian adults tried to pursue their 
previous activities. Some had even secured their new occu-
pation before deciding to move. Arabic teachers found new 
language centres to teach in, a lawyer a new study to work 
in, an architect a new firm, a café manager started a new 
establishment, actors found new theatre plays and TV series 
to act in, and so on. For others, on the contrary, their move 
to Beirut signified a greater change in their life trajectories. 
They seized new opportunities, such as working for inter-
national NGOs dealing with the Syrian crisis. However, in 
addition to having family and friends still in Syria, some 
also kept part of their livelihoods there. They started com-
muting on a regular basis between Beirut and their home 
city in Syria, or adopted city. Actors would go back to Da-
mascus as they were still involved in artistic projects, others 
were still pursuing their higher education and going back 
during exam periods, while some had to go back as they 
were still registered in professional associations (e.g. the bar 
association, and so on) and keeping part of their professional 
activities there.
These back and forth movements were possible as, until 
the beginning of 2015, Syria and Lebanon had an open border 
and free movement policy, until Lebanon started to restrict 
the conditions of entry and stay for Syrians on Lebanese soil. 
These movements from and to Damascus and other cities in 
Syria were also feasible by the fact that the Beirut-Damascus 
road was not cut-off by the fighting going on. Even if, as time 
passed by, more and more checkpoints of the Syrian army 
were set up along the road, extending travel times. Amina, 
a young Arabic teacher, estimated that before these delays 
started, to go from Beirut to Damascus “was taking barely 
two hours, similar to going from one Syrian governorate to 
another” . The Charles Helou station in central Beirut re-
mained most of the time a vibrant transport hub with taxis 
and buses regularly setting off to Damascus and other Syrian 
cities. Since 2015, and the change of entry requirements in 
Lebanon, it has however become more difficult for Syrians 
to continue moving back and forth.
Space of transit
Many young Syrian adults I met perceived their life in the 
central areas of Beirut as a form of transit. That is part of the 
reason why some kept strong links with their previous life 
back in Syria, such as with relatives and acquaintances, and 
even part of their activities, hoping to be able to fully and 
easily settle back there when possible. Others were thinking 
of a second move, mainly to Turkey or Europe. The perceived 
temporariness of their stay in the Lebanese capital was ex-
pressed in several, and sometimes colourful, ways. Rana, a 
young Syrian actor, would explain to me that she does not 
feel that “Beirut is a city which embraces you and makes 
you want to stay in like Damascus does” . Majid, the young 
actor, would tell me that in the apartment he lived in Beirut, 
there was a storage with all the suitcases left by other Syri-
ans who had lived there for a while, before deciding to pur-
sue their journey further on. They would leave behind some 
of their belongings, which they did not have space enough to 
take along, imagining maybe being able to come back later 
to recover them. According to him, “Beirut is like a metro 
station”, a place where you only transit . 
The ‘transitness’ of Beirut for some Syrians was also 
manifested in other ways. With numerous international 
flights not going to Syria anymore, Beirut airport became 
a hub for international transport for Syrians. Buses and 
vans would even bring or pick up Syrian passengers from 
the airport to drive them directly to Damascus. Beirut also 
became an administrative centre for Syrians. With many 
Embassies closing in Syria, most Syrians had to come to 
embassies located in Beirut to file their visa applications 
to overseas countries.
While they were ‘transiting’, and either waiting for 
their flights to depart or their visa applications to be pro-
ceeded, or living ‘between’ cities, some places in Beirut 
became well known to some young Syrian adults; which 
hostels to sleep in, which restaurants to eat in, and in which 
cafés to spend time, and most importantly, to be able to 
meet acquaintances, commonly friends from back in Syria 
who had moved to Beirut. 
Syrians, or the presence of Syrians in Beirut, also start-
ed to change the landscape of Beirut’s streets. Syrian theatre 
plays were showed in Beirut’s theatres, Syrian restaurants 
and cafés opened, some Syrian products and brands could 
be found easily (such as Kharta yerba mate packed in Syria), 
and so on. While this was not completely new in Beirut, the 
intensity of the phenomenon became greater after 2011, and 
it was carried out in new ways. For example, theatre plays 
performed by Syrian actors would not only be showed in 
Beirut, as this was already the case before 2011, but now also 
put on in Beirut, with actors rehearsing there. The visibility 
of Syrians, and of Syrian ‘activities’, increased in Beirut’s 
streets. Amal, a young Lebanese woman, would explain that 
“before, for Lebanese, Syrian presence [in Lebanon] was lim-
ited to the army and migrant workers” . She was referring to 
the presence of the Syrian military forces in Lebanon in the 
aftermath of the Lebanese civil war; presence which lasted 
until 2005. Amal explained that, since 2011, she now meets 
new categories of Syrians in Beirut, like young middle-class 
adults, and that this is becoming something ‘normal’. Picard 
mentions that there had been other categories of Syrians in 
the past in Beirut as well, such as businessmen, but that they 
were mainly ‘invisible’. However, the new interactions with 
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Syrians and their visibility which started after 2011 have 
not always been perceived in a positive way by part of the 
Lebanese opinion, as reflected by a provocative article pub-
lished by the newspaper An-Nahar in January 2015 entitled 
‘Al-Hamra is not getting Lebanese anymore… The Syrian 
growth has changed its identity’ . It referred to Al-Hamra, 
one of the famous trendy and commercial areas of Beirut.
Besides, some of these ‘Syrian places’ also came to re-
flect the ‘transitness’ of the city of Beirut for some Syrians. 
Some establishments indeed closed after a short period of 
existence. This was the case for a Syrian snack restaurant 
which had started a branch in Beirut and shut down after 
less than a year, as well as a café opened and managed in 
part by Syrians, and which had become an important place 
where young Syrians would meet and spend some of their 
time. Oroub, a young Syrian lawyer, was explaining, about 
this café, that “it’s a young Syrian who opened it. He used 
to run a café in Syria (…), and he tried to somehow recreate 
this place in Beirut”. She considered that it was an important 
place as, “for Syrians in Beirut, there is a loss of identity, 
and they like to have places like [this café] where they can 
meet again” .
Conclusion
By the beginning of 2016, most young Syrian adults who, at 
some point since 2011, I had the chance to meet in Beirut 
had moved further on. Some had relocated to Istanbul, while 
others moved to Europe ‘with a visa’ in order to study, work 
or re-unite with members of their family who had success-
fully settled there, as well as using so-called ‘irregular’ chan-
nels and roads. Overall, many Syrians are still in Beirut and 
living in some of its central areas, and Syrian establishments 
are still flourishing in the Lebanese capital.
This article has shown the importance of cities and ur-
ban centrality for some categories of migrants in a context 
of displacement. It has also exposed how some migrants in 
such a situation start living between multiple centralities 
and cities in different countries, sometimes including their 
home town, keeping links in and commuting between these 
different urban spaces. Finally, it has presented how this mo-
bility between several urban centralities is often perceived 
as a temporary life ‘in transit’.
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